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Abstract 
Martin Paleček and Mark Risjord have recently put forward a critical 
evaluation of the ontological turn in anthropological theory. According 
to this philosophically informed theory of ethnographic practice, certain 
insights of twentieth-century analytic philosophy should play a part in 
the methodological debates concerning anthropological fieldwork: 
most importantly, the denial of representationalism and the 
acceptance of the extended mind thesis. In this paper, I will attempt to 
evaluate the advantages and potential drawbacks of ontological 
anthropology—arguing that to become a true alternative to current 
social scientific thinking about methodology, it has to meet certain 
philosophical objections. 
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1. Introduction 
The part that social and cultural anthropological insights usually play in 
philosophical investigations tends to amount to the citation of exotic 
examples. This strategy is generally employed to give proper underpinning to 
a theory concerning the social sciences en masse. Most notably, seemingly 
irreconcilable differences between various cultures and Western civilization 
are adduced to indicate that a framework for theory construction and actual 
practice in various fields of the social sciences should be relativistic in nature. 
Most of the time, advocates of such a position argue for a methodological 
discontinuity between the natural and the social sciences, stressing how 
 
phenomena in the social realm are constituted differently from those of the 
natural world. The subject of the following reflections, ontological 
anthropology, seems to share some basic assumptions with other theories of 
methodological heterogeneity, though it also attempts to reinvigorate the 
interpretative tradition of social scientific methodology by turning its 
attention to contemporary philosophy of mind. With the ontological turn, 
anthropological methodology now seems to incorporate insights of the 
analytic philosophical tradition into its own practice, since, as Paleček and 
Risjord (2013, 6) have pointed out, both the denial of representationalism and 
the acceptance of the extended mind thesis (EMT) are necessary for the 
correct articulation of an ontological standpoint in anthropology. These two 
theses, coupled with the emphasis on alien concepts and the adoption of 
native terminology into anthropological theory, constitute the backbone of 
this new methodology. It is a project worthy of attention and further 
elaboration since it promises a viable alternative to both overwhelmingly 
scientistic accounts of social phenomena and often self-defeating versions of 
relativism. 
While the main premises of the ontological point of view are certainly 
appealing, I will argue that, in its current formulation, the ontological turn 
either breaks down before it is completed (so to speak), stripping 
anthropology not only of its explanatory power but also of its interpretational 
techniques, or it only amounts to the explication of background assumptions 
in anthropological fieldwork—some of which have already been made 
explicit by philosophers arguing for a relativistic approach to social science. 
In the first section, I will examine the analytic philosophical input into 
anthropological theory in two steps. First, I attempt to draw a number of 
conclusions from the application of anti-representationalism in anthropology. 
Second, I examine the possible consequences of EMT, and whether the thesis 
could be applied to those cultural phenomena that anthropology concerns 
itself with. The second section of the paper will focus on ontological 
anthropology’s aspirations compared with other radical/relativistic 
approaches in the philosophy of social science. 
2. The Denial of Representationalism 
In a certain sense, anthropology has always been concerned with local 
ontologies of the various cultures it attempted to study and understand. The 
change that the ontological turn brings to this practice is the emphasizing of 
objects and artifacts themselves as opposed to their meanings, arguing that 
the division between signifier and signified is misleading and arbitrary—or, 
as Henare, Hollbraad, and Vastell (2007, 2) put it, “the aim of this method is 
to take things encountered in the field as they present themselves, rather than 
immediately assuming that they signify, represent, or stand for something 
else.” 
To accomplish this task, anthropology has to abandon representationalist 
assumptions that provide the foundations for both cognitive and interpretative 
anthropological theories. As Paleček and Risjord (2013, 5) point out, 
interpretative approaches kept interactions and speech in their focus, while 
ontological anthropology turns its attention to the speakers and the objects 
surrounding them. There is no need to assume mediating devices (e.g., 
conceptual schemes) between symbol and its meaning because, strictly 
speaking, “the object becomes the symbol” (Paleček and Risjord 2013, 8). 
What ontological anthropology attempts to deny with this step is what usually 
gets taken for granted in social scientific practice: that objects tend to 
represent something else depending on the context they are used in. 
Moreover, it sometimes also seems to imply the denial of the doctrine that 
thinking about the world and fellow members of our society in it requires 
some kind of representational content. While both of these statements 
attempt to characterize human cognition and the nature of mind, they are not 
to be treated as equivalent. The latter is the claim that our mind does not need 
to have any kinds of representations at all in order for us to understand each 
other and try to render the phenomena surrounding us intelligible. It is the 
denial of the representational (or computational) theory of mind, probably 
most famously championed by Daniel Dennett.
1
 The former thesis could be 
understood as in a certain sense weaker than this: it only wishes to deny 
symbolic representation. The difference might be illustrated by the following 
example: when I see a particular object (a hollow log, for instance) and I am 
told that it is the spirit of the ancestors, there are two kinds of anti-
representationalist attitudes that I can adopt. In its weaker sense, I can deny 
that the log represents the spirit of the ancestors, maintaining that it simply is 
that spirit, while in the stronger sense, I can deny that there are any 
propositions in my mind about the spirit of the ancestors that can either 
correctly or falsely represent states of affairs in the external world. 
Ontological anthropology mostly argues for the tenability of the weaker 
position in this sense: it denies the representational relations between artifacts 
and their supposed symbolic meanings. Equating object with symbol, 
however, poses a rather difficult problem for the role of interpretation in 
anthropological practice. If we presuppose with Henare et al. that “meanings 
are not carried by things but just are identical to them” (Henare, Holbraad, 
and Wastell 2007, 4), it leaves no room for interpretation in anthropological 
practice since there is nothing left to interpret. To use a familiar example: the 
Nuer utterance that “twins are birds” could no longer be made intelligible to 
us with reference to their cosmology and their kinship system because that 
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would involve the construction of a specific narrative in which the 
fundamental differences between Western and Nuer ontology are explained, 
and a plausible interpretation is proposed. If birds do not signify family ties 
or children of a transcendent entity (or any other thing for that matter), then 
there is nothing else to understand besides the ever-so-puzzling assertion that 
a human being is identical to a feathery creature. 
Proponents of ontological anthropology probably would not like to arrive 
at such conclusions; therefore, they do not want to eliminate interpretation 
altogether. What the anthropologist should interpret, however, is not the 
meaning of symbols, but the world that members of the culture she studies 
have built up and inhabit: 
The ethnographer’s subject is closely related to his own community, those 
people with whom he interpretively engages. The ethnographer’s responsibility 
is to capture the way in which the subject is interpreted by his own community. 
That is, the ethnographer needs to take into account the ongoing interpretive 
negotiations within the subject’s community. And these interpretations may 
expose very different relationships to objects than are found in the 
ethnographer’s community. (Paleček and Risjord 2013, 16) 
This passage seems to indicate that the interpretative task of the 
ethnographer is to uncover the relationships between people and their 
surroundings—without references to symbols and meanings. However, 
“capturing the way” somebody or something is interpreted can hardly do 
away with the distinction between object and meaning, for if it is taken 
seriously, anthropology could not amount to anything more than the 
description (and not the “thick description” championed by Geertz) of a given 
culture. When the poison oracle (to cite another well-known example from 
Evans-Pritchard) decides that a specific member of the Azande tribe is a 
witch, then that is all the anthropologist can repeat in his own words, which 
seems to lack precisely that layer of an anthropological account that 
guarantees its informativity. The ontological anthropologist’s answer to that 
could be the proposal from within the framework of perspectivism: “what a 
kind or category of object is turns on the relation of that object to something 
else” (Paleček and Risjord 2013, 20). That is roughly the idea behind a 
perspectivist picture—nothing could be qualified as belonging to a certain 
category of objects in itself, for nothing ever manifests itself in the world 
absolutely decontextualized. Accordingly, should we wish to enquire about 
the nature of certain cultural phenomena, we have to take into account the 
immediate social context that these phenomena appear in. The witch in the 
above example is a witch in relation to the Zande people and—probably—is 
not a witch for the observing anthropologist. The problems with this 
perspectivist picture are twofold. First, these relational properties confuse the 
ontological commitments to such a degree that it becomes rather troublesome 
and paradoxical from a methodological standpoint. Granted, this objection 
loses its force with the acceptance of multiple realities that can be made 
intelligible through analogies and comparisons but that would involve the 
language of symbols, meanings, and representations—a step that is not 
allowed to the ontological anthropologist. References to meanings are 
omitted, yet this result comes with the tacit assumption that not only are there 
infinitely many worlds with substantially different ontologies, but one is 
literally a different person in all of them. 
There are at least two approaches that have argued for a conclusion of that 
nature, yet neither of them is suitable for the ontological anthropologist. The 
first way to cope with the problem of many worlds turns on a fundamental 
difference between things found in nature and those that are taken to be real 
in a given society. It could be argued that witchcraft is a social institution: a 
wizard and a witch are different roles in society with a specific function. The 
latest elaboration of such a position can be found in Searle (2010), where the 
institutional account of social phenomena is spelled out in great detail.
2
 
According to that proposal, social phenomena come about when members of 
a society ascribe status-functions to objects that otherwise do not possess 
such qualities. This ascription follows the logic of declarations and usually 
takes the form of a sentence expressing that “x counts as y in context C” 
(Searle 2010, 90-102). To use one of Searle’s examples: “Copper coins count 
as money in our society.” For our present purpose, the emphasis should be 
placed on the relation between copper coins and money: to exist at all, the 
institution of money needs something to count as something else. Money is 
not money simpliciter, money is copper coins or numbers printed on specific 
types of paper or seashells or anything else that stands for money. Likewise, 
“specific stones in oblong boxes count as souls in our society” seems to 
express a status-function declaration of an alien culture. Notice how members 
of a given culture need not actually say those words in order for an institution 
to function properly, and they might as well believe that certain stones in 
oblong boxes just are souls without any reference to specific relations 
between a concept and an object. The same holds for our own society: 
someone in possession of a nickel usually does not think that she holds a 
copper coin in her hand that counts as something else in the grand scheme of 
things—to all intents and purposes, she is holding money, not a symbol of 
money. The pragmatics of everyday life do not necessitate these alienating 
descriptions of social phenomena; social scientific understanding and 
interpretation, however, could make great use of such descriptions. This way 
of interpreting alien and familiar social practices alike can be traced back to 
Max Weber (see, for example, Winch 1958, 117-20), though its recent 
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articulation comes from Nigel Pleasants, in the context of Marx’s analysis of 
commodity exchange: 
Owning a certain quantity of money grants the owner the right to exchange it 
for any commodity or commodities of equivalent value offered for sale. To us 
“insiders,” our everyday economic transactions are totally trivial actions, hardly 
in need of any explanation. But if we simply describe what actually takes place 
in exchange the process begins to look rather strange [ . . . ] Marx is saying 
that, from the perspective of the outsider-anthropologist, it is not at all obvious 
that X quantity of Y commodity should be equal to, the same as, A quantity of B 
commodity. In what way, exactly, are the entities in economic exchanges 
supposed to be equal? The things exchanged look like very different kinds of 
object (they need not even be “objects” at all), with very different kinds of 
properties, effects, and uses. (Pleasants 2000, 304) 
What follows is the description of money and seemingly unproblematic 
everyday practices in terms that are rarely thought of by those participating in 
the social practice under scrutiny. The value of such descriptions lies in the 
mode of presentation: that is, the heuristic device that directs our attention to 
details of social processes that would have otherwise remained hidden to us. 
Turning back to my earlier point, the analysis of social phenomena in terms 
of an “institutional vocabulary” might be able to shed light on the 
sociologically or anthropologically relevant aspects of social life in different 
worlds, though its representational content seems to be ineliminable. 
Another way to resolve the problem of many ontologies is the theory of 
“making up people,” as articulated by Ian Hacking.3 According to him, the 
ways in which one can be a person in a given society cannot be separated 
from the particular social practices themselves. It makes no sense, for 
example, to speak of multiple personalities in the 1600s because the notion of 
multiple personality disorder did not come into being until the turn of the 
twentieth century. Bearing that in mind, it becomes impossible (not merely 
technically, but conceptually) for someone in the early modern centuries to 
actually be a multiple personality. People create the categories to sort out 
different kinds of persons, but, in turn, these categories end up creating the 
persons they wished to categorize. Hacking calls this process “dynamic 
nominalism,” for it is the creation of kinds of persons through an act of 
labeling and institutionalization, but it can be affected and modified by social 
changes (specifically by the conscious change in the behavior of those 
categorized). The examples do not have to stop at various forms of deviance 
that we managed to label only recently: any kind of social role that is specific 
to a certain social setting is a likely candidate. Much like people we 
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encounter on a daily basis (waiters, cashiers, policemen, etc.), witches and 
wizards are also examples of different ways one can be a person. It is only 
intelligible to understand an act as a rain dance (instead of a celebration or a 
form of entertainment) as long as there are witches and shamans among the 
people we try to investigate. That is, to be a witch or a shaman are both valid 
ways to be a person in the given culture. “What is curious about human 
action is that by and large what I am deliberately doing depends on the 
possibilities of description. [ . . . ] Hence if new modes of description come 
into being, new possibilities for action come into being in consequence” 
(Hacking 1987, 166). 
These descriptions and types of action, however, are not constituted by 
perspectives alone. What gives rise to these new kinds of people is, to a large 
extent, the aforementioned process of labeling and the various forms of 
institutionalization.
4
 The mechanism behind labeling is similar to the creation 
of institutional facts: “people who possess the characteristics x and y are to be 
referred to as Z from now on.” In fact, labeling can only succeed through the 
process of institutionalization, for a notion has to be institutionally endorsed 
to take root in the everyday life of a whole community. 
All these solutions to the problem of many ontologies involve 
representations of one form or another. That is not to say, however, that 
social ontology cannot do away with the representational content of 
institutional facts: I only intended to point out that ontological anthropology 
needs to deal with these issues if it is to be considered a general 
methodological framework for philosophically informed anthropological 
practice.
5
 
The second problem with perspectivism lies in its differentiation from 
relativism. To use Castro’s example, perspectivism holds that the logical 
status of an utterance such as “Isabel’s son Michael is my nephew” is 
identical to the one stating that “mud is the hammock of tapirs” (Viverios de 
Castro 2012, 110). Admitting that my nephew is not merely a nephew from 
my perspective but—besides that—he really and objectively is a nephew, the 
terminology used to express this relation is not relativistic. There is, however, 
a difference between assertions expressing familial relations and assertions 
equating mud with a hammock for tapirs. Literally, I am in no position to 
judge whether mud is or is not hammock for the tapir, since I lack the 
cognitive architecture needed to view the world through the tapir’s eye. 
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Furthermore, “really and objectively,” mud is not a hammock—if Castro is to 
be believed, mud is not anything in and of itself. Since we can disqualify the 
literal meaning of the above assertion, we are left with a metaphorical 
interpretation. 
A statement about mud from the tapir’s perspective is neither verifiable 
nor falsifiable, but similar statements about human affairs might help in 
accentuating the difference. If I state that “my love is a delicate flower,” I 
may hint at certain characteristics of the subject of my affections, but nobody 
would come to the conclusion that my love is, really and objectively, capable 
of photosynthesis—nor would they think that I literally perceive a flower 
when I look at the one I love. Once again, a metaphorical interpretation is 
needed, which presents yet another challenge to ontological anthropology. It 
seems that the theory wishes to interpret metaphorical assertions literally, 
without further reflections on what it takes metaphors to be. The theory might 
escape Davidson’s criticism of relativism, as Paleček and Risjord 
persuasively argue, but perspectivism is incompatible, for example, with 
Davidson’s theory of metaphors (see D. Davidson 1984, 245-64). Once 
again, I do not wish to claim that Davidson’s (rather unpopular) view of 
metaphors is the one to endorse, but when operating with assertions like 
“mud is the hammock of tapirs,” one needs to say a great deal more about the 
nature of metaphorical content, especially if the aim is to retain their truth-
values and uphold the claim of anti-representationalism at the same time. 
There might be, however, a different way to tackle the problem of 
metaphors. Perhaps one could imagine a culture wherein loved ones are 
identical to blossoms (just like twins are identical to birds among the Nuer), 
but even in that case, the perspectivistic approach only allows us to state that 
loved ones are blossoms from the speakers’ perspective, and one thing cannot 
be really and objectively something else depending on the context. In that 
case, perspectivism boils down to relativism—which may or may not be good 
news for anthropological theory, but it is a much easier task to understand 
relativistic remarks than it is to interpret perspectivistic statements 
appropriately without reference to meanings or symbols. 
In his book on scientific perspectivism, Ronald Giere faces the problem of 
relativism as well. Assessing the perspectivistic approach to color science,
6
 
he remarks that it may, indeed, attract relativistic interpretations. To answer 
the relativist, he proposes the following: 
On a perspectival understanding of color vision, however, while there is 
relativity to a particular type of chromatic visual system, this relativity need not 
be objectionable. The trichromatic perspective is a widely shared, species-
specific trait among humans, and, once acculturated into a linguistic 
community, individuals are highly constrained in their public color judgments. 
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Thus, understanding objectivity as reliable intersubjective agreement, color 
judgments turn out to be quite objective. (Giere 2006, 33-34) 
The relativity present in perspectival accounts of color vision is not 
objectionable because there is a cross-cultural trait in the physiology of the 
human body (that we as a species have, in an overwhelming majority of the 
cases, three cones in our retinas), and based on precisely this trait, the 
similarity in our judgments is guaranteed. Objectivity is retained as 
intersubjective agreement, though even in this less robust form, it cannot 
intelligibly apply to such radical claims as the one about the tapir and its 
mud/hammock. To be “really and objectively” hammock, then, there has to 
be an intersubjective agreement regarding the nature of mud: that recognizing 
it as hammock does not deviate significantly from judgments made from our 
own perspective. Moreover, color vision has something physical to serve as 
its cross-cultural backbone (the trichromatic visual system), whereas 
statements about artifacts usually lack a viable equivalent of this. 
In order for the ontological turn to be completed, one would need to turn 
away from any kind of representational content, all the while carrying on 
interpretations of how the people studied interpret each other. As Paleček and 
Risjord put it, “Meaning arises from a web of interactions, and properly 
understanding meaning requires entry into this web” (Paleček and Risjord 
2013, 21). The uncovering of meaning, however, presupposes some kind of 
representation—not necessarily on the anthropologist’s part. Members of a 
culture may populate their world with entirely different ontological entities 
than we do, and specific things may have meanings for them that are so 
unfamiliar to the meanings we attach to the same things that it requires 
careful interpretative steps to reconstruct the world through their eyes—or at 
least attempt to offer a coherent narrative. This is evidenced by Paleček and 
Risjord’s example of the “hedgehog in a cage” and its significance in Czech 
history. “The role of the mechanical puzzle in the stories and its use as a 
political symbol is part of the way that members of the community interact 
with the object” (Paleček and Risjord 2013, 17). The object was originally 
meant to be a children’s toy, but it can be used—under specific 
circumstances—as a political symbol. But how can it be a political symbol, if 
symbols and objects are one and the same? If the hedgehog symbolizes 
power, then the hedgehog is power and is not a children’s toy. Should it be 
so, the proper evaluation of a statement like that is hard to arrive at without 
bringing back the interpretation of interactions and symbolism—something 
that ontological anthropology found to be the most misleading part of the 
interpretative tradition. 
3. The Extended Mind Thesis 
The second methodological tool that ontological anthropology wishes to 
incorporate into anthropological practice is the acceptance of the EMT. It has 
been the subject of constant criticism throughout the years, and the thesis—
originally formulated by Andy Clark and David Chalmers
7—still remains one 
of the most discussed topics in contemporary philosophy of mind. 
Summarizing the most fundamental insights of the thesis, Paleček and 
Risjord write, 
The idea is that what is in the mind is not limited to the activities of the brain 
(or Cartesian mind). Rather, objects and bodily actions in the environment are 
legitimately thought of as parts of the mind, and their use is part of thinking. 
Shifting beads on an abacus, on this view, is not essentially different from 
doing sums in one’s head. The movement of the beads is an aspect of thinking 
and, thereby, a part of the person’s mind. (Paleček and Risjord 2013, 8) 
They go on to explain how certain social practices of the anthropologist’s 
concern could be thought of as parts of the mind by providing an example in 
the form of rituals. “Some of the ethnographic analyses in the ontological 
turn argue that objects used ritually are not representations of history or 
kinship; they are either part of memory or part of the mechanics of thinking 
about history or kinship” (Paleček and Risjord 2013, 8-9). As long as we take 
EMT to mean simply that whatever devices we use that would count as parts 
of the mind were they deployed internally,
8
 rituals could very well be thought 
of as mnemonic devices and therefore extensions of the mind. The obvious 
disadvantage of such a formulation of the EMT, however, is that it leaves 
room for much more implausible suggestions. 
Let us suppose that I have to meet a friend of mine in front of the Museum 
of Natural History, but I do not know its exact location. I could proceed 
exactly like Clark and Chalmers’ fictional handicapped protagonist does and 
consult my notebook for guidelines, or I could just as easily ask some people 
passing by and inquire about the directions. The example could even be 
supplemented with the following: I once knew where the Museum could be 
found, so I only need a reminder to start me on my way. Conceived this way, 
the people I ask for directions “function” in the same way a ritual does in the 
anthropological example: they are parts of the mechanics of thinking about 
my itinerary and, therefore, parts of my mind, which sounds rather 
counterintuitive. Clark (2008), however, provides a shortlist of criteria that 
have to be met for something to count as a part of the mind, precisely to limit 
the scope of EMT, so that we cannot expand the mind to engulf any and all 
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devices or processes that might appear as substitutes for its internal activities. 
Here are his conditions in his own words: 
1. That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked. (Otto 
always carries the notebook and won’t answer that he “doesn’t know” 
until after he has consulted it). 
2. That any information thus retrieved be more or less automatically 
endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the 
opinions of other people, for example). It should be deemed about as 
trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory. 
3. That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible 
as and when required. 
4. That the information in the notebook [in the device taken to be a part of 
the mind—A. S.] has been consciously endorsed at some point in the 
past and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement.
9
 
Ritually used objects have to meet these criteria to be considered parts of 
their users’ mind, and while they could be thought of as meeting criterion 
number 2 (people taking part in a ritual more or less automatically endorse 
and do not question the information retrieved through the process) and is 
compatible with criterion number 3 (when a certain event in the community’s 
life requires a ritual to take place, it should be easily accessible—indeed, in 
most cases it seems like a necessity), criteria numbers 1 and 4 cast serious 
doubts on the idea’s sustainability. 
In the case of a ritually used object, it is not universally true that the object 
is “typically invoked” as a mnemonic device to remind tribe members of their 
familial relations. To cite an example from Geertz, Balinese cockfights do 
embody the relations between various kin-groups and villages, but Balinese 
peasants do not consult the processes surrounding the fights for mnemonic 
purposes. Tasked with positioning themselves within the kinship systems of 
the island, the peasants will not typically invoke these rituals—but rather take 
part in them based on their pre-existing knowledge of their place in said 
systems. Hence, Geertz writes regarding the various intricacies of the rituals 
associated with the cockfights: “The Balinese peasants are quite aware of all 
this and can and, at least to an ethnographer, do state most of it in 
approximately the same terms that I have” Geertz (1979, 210). The rituals 
also cannot be said to be available for consulting whenever one is asked 
about her family ties—if the subject does not readily know about these 
things, she does not have the option of “using the device” whenever she feels 
like it. 
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This, in part, is also true of criterion number 4, which amounts to the 
conscious endorsement of the information stored in the external part of the 
mind—and also implies that information can be added, subtracted, or 
changed by the “user” should she feel the need to add to, subtract from, or 
change it. Most ritualistic processes and ritually used objects do not lend this 
kind of authority to the people taking part in—or using—them. If 
anthropology wishes to embrace the EMT, it should consider its augmented 
formulation that has a much more restricted scope than the original thesis 
once had, and it should provide arguments to underpin why ritually used 
objects qualify as parts of the mind in this changed scenario.
10
 The alternative 
option, of course, is to question the plausibility of Clark’s additional 
conditions, that is, of the restrictions placed on potential parts of extended 
minds. This move, however, resets the current debate, and its proponents 
would have to find different solutions to the problems formulated against the 
initial conception of EMT so as not to arrive at Clark’s restrictions. Should 
they succeed in doing so, the wide-scope version of EMT would still make it 
exceptionally hard for them to argue why the extensions should stop at the 
level of ritualistically used objects and exclude fellow members of the tribe. 
When rituals are thought of as mnemonic devices, people taking part in them 
are components of that device—in the same sense that the objects being used 
are components of it. In that case, ontological anthropology would be forced 
to argue for the plausibility of a picture that ultimately paints everyone as 
being a part of everyone else’s mind. 
4. What Remains 
The welcome given to meaning and interpretation and the difficulties facing 
the incorporation of EMT into ontological anthropology allow us to 
summarize the main goals of an anthropology construed in this way: it 
attempts to understand and offer an interpretation of different civilizations 
and cultures, starting from the various ways objects and artifacts play a part 
in their everyday lives. We can only talk about a culture adequately if we take 
into account what the different things—either found in nature or artificially 
made—are to the members of the community. Should we fail to grasp the 
connections these members share with one another and with the things 
surrounding them, our investigations would not amount to more than 
superficial descriptions of an alien culture from our own perspective, with 
complete disregard for their world and how it is furnished. To escape this 
pitfall, the anthropologist has to examine these connections carefully and the 
mode of interaction between agents and objects, then reconstruct how this 
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It is worth mentioning once again that the EMT is far from being universally 
accepted—for general critical remarks, see Sprevak (2009) and Adams and Aizawa 
(2010). 
“web of interactions” constitutes a world in which the subjects of her studies 
can live their everyday lives. 
To reiterate, ontological anthropology distances itself from cognitive and 
interpretative approaches because it shifts the focus from interaction and 
speech to the objects themselves. It turns out, however, that this altered focus 
affects only the starting point of anthropological practice: turn to the things 
that are “the most abstract categories found in a culture” (Paleček and Risjord 
2013, 6). In the beginning, then, the interpretation of interactions and speech 
should follow. This shifting of emphasis does not forgo an obvious difficulty 
inherent in every theory about anthropological fieldwork: the problem of how 
one comes to know what the things in a given society actually are. For the 
anthropologist, it cannot be obvious upon first sight that in any particular 
community, twins are considered to be birds—nor can he come to such a 
conclusion based on the observations of the tribesmen’s behavior. This is 
what Martin Hollis called the problem of bridgehead-sentences that one has 
to translate from the native language to understand what their world is like 
(see Hollis 1970). He argued that an alien culture’s rationality is not 
something the anthropologist empirically discovers—it is not a hypothesis to 
be tested but an assumption on the scientist’s part. The problem with things is 
a modified version of Hollis’s dilemma: to find out that twins are birds and 
start our investigations there, we already have to be acquainted with symbols 
and signs in the form of a native language. 
Should we resist all this (the interpretation of symbols), our descriptions 
would seem to lose significant parts of their informativity: we could, indeed, 
turn to local ontologies but merely stating what they depict the world to be 
like would fail to allow any insight into the process of how different cultures 
impose order on the surrounding natural world. One cannot complete the 
ontological turn without attempting to comprehend the constituents of a given 
ontology: if the answer truly lies in admitting that we know nothing about 
these worlds, simple descriptions would hardly help us in mapping out the 
ontologies of the people shaping them. Imposing our own proposed 
interpretations on these systems is in itself an even worse methodological 
approach—but there should be some middle ground within our reach via 
analogies and hypotheses that could illuminate seemingly puzzling scenarios. 
Jettisoning meanings and symbolism altogether not only prevents us from 
committing the ethnocentrist mistake but also prevents us from being able to 
give (or at least attempt to give) an adequate and comprehensible account of 
local ontologies. 
While this is an old problem any new theory has to face, the ontological 
point of view seems to inherit not only the difficulties but also the 
background assumptions of earlier anthropological theories. The summary in 
the paragraphs above could have been written about many other accounts of 
ethnographic methodology that do not wish to paint a picture of anthropology 
as a universalistic enterprise.
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 The main difference, naturally, is the denial of 
representationalism in the ontologically motivated theories—but, as I have 
tried to illustrate, it is not entirely obvious how an anthropological study can 
be both informative and adequate by overcoming the dualism inherent in the 
differentiation of things and their meanings. 
Another aspect of the ontological turn concerns the potential benefits that 
come from adopting such a point of view, something that both Holbraad and 
Paleček and Risjord emphasize, is the potential reevaluation of the 
anthropologist’s own way of thinking: “To reject representationalism is to 
acknowledge that we do not know what the Nuer are talking about when they 
say ‘twins are birds.’ The challenge, then, is for the ethnographer to revise 
her own views” (Paleček and Risjord 2013, 9). In this sense, ontological 
anthropology can be a tool that facilitates reflection on our own concepts and 
the interactions we ourselves participate in in our own community. Engaging 
in activities alien to our social customs and encountering concepts used in 
unfamiliar ways does not simply enrich our knowledge of foreign cultures but 
also deepens our understanding of ourselves—and maybe even prove to be 
conducive to modifying our own lives. While this may indeed be the case, 
ontological anthropology is not the first methodological/theoretical approach 
to point it out. As Peter Winch put it in the 1960s, “Our blindness to the point 
of primitive modes of life is a corollary of the pointlessness of much of our 
own life” (Winch 1964, 106). 
5. A Partial Conclusion 
The aim of ontological anthropology is to offer a radical alternative to how 
anthropological fieldwork is usually done—and to incorporate key theories of 
contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy of mind into a 
methodological model for a specific social science. In the above remarks, I 
attempted to show that while its aspirations are in line with relativistic 
approaches to social science in general, the implications of some of its main 
theses ultimately end up preventing it from achieving that goal. These 
remarks are not meant to render ontological anthropology a lost cause in any 
way. I am deeply sympathetic to its general idea of many ontologies, as well 
as its intent to facilitate change in current social scientific methodology. 
What I wished to show is that its philosophical background comes with 
equally important philosophical problems that ontological anthropology has 
to address to become a viable alternative to contemporary views on social 
scientific theory and practice. 
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